

WAR POWERS AND *THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION:*
U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

by

Matthew Mark Simmons

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by

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ABSTRACT

The war powers debate that has occupied so much public attention in the decades following Vietnam has typically portrayed the Congress and the president engaged in a continuous constitutional struggle over institutional prerogatives. Although the war powers literature presents many explanations of why Congress has not been able to effectively control presidential war making, most studies seem to take one thing for granted: that Congress is motivated by a desire to do so. The present study challenges this central assumption and introduces a new methodology to examine congressional behavior during consideration of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (1983) and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (1991). Using Douglas Arnold's *Logic of Congressional Action* as a model, the researcher conducts a content analysis of congressional floor debate to determine if members of Congress are also motivated by electoral calculations when deciding matters of war and peace. The results indicate that in fact, members do seem to be motivated by electoral forces. Furthermore, the study reveals that content analysis can be a useful tool that holds the potential to make a significant contribution to both the war powers literature and to models of congressional action.

DEDICATION

I dedicate this work to my parents, Raymond and Jean. Without their continuing encouragement and support, none of my personal or professional achievements would have been possible. I owe them everything.

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INTRODUCTION

On November 8, 1990, just two days after the midterm congressional elections, President Bush announced that he would double the American military presence in Saudi Arabia – from 230,000 troops to almost half a million – to ensure an “adequate offensive military option” against Iraq (Smith 1980, 201). Since Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August, Congress had wholeheartedly supported the president’s policy of economically sanctioning Iraq while defending Saudi Arabia from further Iraqi aggression. Very few members of Congress, however, supported the idea of offensive action before economic sanctions had an opportunity to take effect.¹ Yet only nine weeks later, both the House and the Senate endorsed a joint resolution authorizing the president to use military force to eject Iraq from Kuwait (Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution 1991).

John Lehman (1992) explained the about-face in Congress over U.S. policy in the Gulf quite simply:

The majority in Congress did not want war, did not want to obstruct one if necessary, and certainly did not want to look like an ally of Saddam’s in the process. (45)

Lehman’s view is that members of Congress treat the question of making war just like they do any other legislative decision – by weighing the available options against their own personal goals. With this analysis, Lehman placed himself among a group of congressional scholars who assume that the primary goal of members of Congress is to win reelection. According to this school of thought, members of Congress ultimately

¹ Director of Central Intelligence William Webster projected that economic sanctions would take at least nine months to have a significant impact on Iraq’s ability to maintain its military. See his testimony

decided to authorize the president to use force against Iraq not on moral, practical, or legal grounds, but rather based on a calculus of electoral considerations. As Douglas Arnold (1990) put it, members of Congress estimate not only citizens' expressed preferences for various policy proposals, but also their *potential* preferences. In this instance, members considered the possibility that constituents would hold them accountable at the polls for plunging the country into a war that, for all they knew, could have been parallel in scope to this country's experience Vietnam. They considered the possibility that delaying military action might only make an inevitable war even more costly in terms of American lives, and that their constituents would then hold them accountable for obstructing that action. In addition, no member wanted to become vulnerable to a potential challenger's charge that he or she had aided the enemy by delaying decisive action or by dividing public opinion on the matter.

Arnold's *Logic of Congressional Action*, however, contrasts theories offered by many prominent constitutional scholars. In his assessment, Lehman trivialized as just another politically motivated vote what constitutional scholars have characterized as another chapter in the continuing constitutional struggle between the Congress and the president over the nation's war powers. Broadly defined, this 'war powers debate' pits the president's constitutional powers as commander-in-chief and as chief diplomat against the Congress's powers to declare war, to provide for and maintain military forces, and to appropriate funds. Placed in such a context, much of the scholarly literature naturally assumes that members are motivated not necessarily by electoral concerns, but

by a desire to maintain institutional prerogatives (Henkin 1996; Fisher 1995; Schlesinger 1973).

Much of the war powers literature suggests that Congress has tried to assert its authority vis-à-vis that of the president but has been constrained by such obstacles as poor draftsmanship, inadequate legislative tools, or presidential usurpation. Economic theories of legislative action, however, suggest otherwise: that members have goals that they continuously pursue, and every vote cast is directed toward achieving one or more of these goals. Under this view, voting on matters of war and peace is no different from voting on economic or environmental policy. Instead of seriously trying to assert legislative control over presidential initiatives, members of Congress may simply act in whatever manner well insulates them from the possibility of electoral retribution.

Although the war powers literature abounds of theories and hypotheses about why Congress acts as it does, it lacks any empirical exploration of *how* Congress makes its decisions. Similarly, little research exists applying economic and electoral theories to the politics of war. This study expands the literature by applying Arnold's *Logic of Congressional Action* to two post-Vietnam cases commonly addressed in the war powers literature: Lebanon in 1983 and Iraq in 1991. To do so, I adopt and modify variables John Howard (1978) used in conducting a study on presidential decision-making in instances of undeclared war. In seeking to answer why undeclared wars have occurred, Howard examined the perceptions of the decision-maker – the president – through the

media of presidential communications and statements. His method serves as a model for the present study: an analysis of members' of Congress perceptions as decision-makers.

To examine how members perceived each of these variables during debate, I conduct a content analysis of 100 statements by Senators and Representatives in the *Congressional Record*. My use of content analytic methodology is a new contribution both to the study of legislative behavior as well as to the war powers literature. The findings suggest that members of Congress do not take into account only electoral calculations or only institutional prerogatives when speaking on the floor; rather, they consider many factors in concert. For example, members at times may simply try to maintain a "piece of the policy-making pie," so to speak, while insulating themselves from electoral retribution. In other words, although members of Congress may be driven by a desire to win reelection, they may not be as much concerned with asserting positive control over the president as they may be with maintaining at least a nominal role in the policy-making process.

THE WAR POWERS LITERATURE

The president and Congress constantly struggle over a wide range of constitutional powers and responsibilities – not least of which is the power to commit the nation’s armed forces to hostilities abroad. Although Congress at times has seriously challenged the president’s dominance in deciding when and where to exercise the nation’s “war power,” the latter half of the twentieth century clearly has been a time of presidential ascendancy. Congress intended the War Powers Resolution of 1973 to provide it with a means of controlling America’s military commitments abroad after the debacle that was Vietnam. Twenty-five years after enacting the War Powers Act over a presidential veto, scholars still debate whether Congress yet exercises meaningful control over the president’s ability to commit the nation’s armed forces to hostilities. What we do know is that Congress has not consistently invoked the War Powers Act to assert its authority in checking the president’s military initiatives.² This issue has become the subject of a voluminous accumulation of scholarly research by both political scientists and legal analysts.

Louis Fisher (1995; 1997) made a strong argument that Congress had incapacitated itself with its poor drafting of the War Powers Act. Fisher argued that the main fault of the War Powers Act was that “instead of trying to define the precise conditions under which presidents may act, [Congress] relied on procedural safeguards” (1997, 279). More specifically, the language of the law is so ambiguous that enforcement as its drafters envisioned it is nearly impossible. For example, it requires the president to

² Congress has at different times and in different instances either invoked the War Powers Act or not done so; furthermore, when invoked, Congress has not always acted under the same provisions of that Act.

consult with Congress “in every possible instance.” This language leaves considerable discretion to the president as to the form and timing of consultation. The Act also requires that the president, after introducing troops into hostilities, report to Congress within forty-eight hours. However, precisely what conditions require a report is unclear from the language of the legislation. Furthermore, the two methods of direct legislative control provided for in the legislation are, according to Fisher, impotent. First, the act sets deadlines after which the president must either seek congressional approval to continue or withdraw the troops from hostilities. The problem with deadlines is that they do not take effect unless the president reports under a very specific section of the law: Section 4(a)(1). Second, the act directs that Congress may direct the president to withdraw troops by passage of a concurrent resolution, or “legislative veto.” In 1983, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutional the legislative veto in *INS v Chadha*. These faults lead Fisher to conclude that Congress should revise the War Powers Act to empower Congress with “the powerful weapons at its command Through its prerogative to authorize programs and appropriate funds, it can define and limit presidential power” (1995, 199-200).

Marc Smyrl (1988) and Harold Koh (1990) posited similar rationales for Congress’s seeming inefficacy in controlling presidential war power. While both Smyrl and Koh shared Fisher’s concern about the inherent dysfunction in the language of the War Powers Act, Smyrl more explicitly stated the problem as he saw it: that the War Powers Act

Failed to establish the link between Congress' ultimate power to terminate certain activities by denying them funding, and its desire to participate in the policy decisions preceding them. (58)

Both authors, however, took Fisher's argument one step further by moving beyond the linguistic mechanics of the War Powers Act. Smyrl suggested that while the instances of executive/legislative confrontation over the introduction of troops to hostilities were important as precedents, "they were not in and of themselves controversial, or even particularly important" (59). In other words, Congress lacked the political will to force a legal confrontation. Because decisive congressional action requires a two-thirds majority in both houses, a "critical mass" of congressional members has simply been unwilling to take responsibility for setting foreign policy. Instead, members prefer to leave the decision with the president until things start going badly (1990, 132).

David Hall (1991) expanded this view in a study of war powers during the Reagan Administration. In this work, Hall examined the puzzling case of Lebanon from 1982-1984. When Reagan first sent troops to Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force in August 1982, Congress, not recognizing the prospect of "imminent hostilities," acquiesced. Over the next nine months, however, it became increasingly clear that U.S. troops were indeed engaging in hostilities. Spiraling military and civilian casualties led Congress to reconsider its earlier reluctance to take an active role in U.S.-Lebanese policy. In June 1983, Congress passed the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act, which effectively ratified the president's actions to that date. Not until shortly before the October 23 terrorist bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut did Congress take any action to curb the president's power – and then only putting an eighteen month limit on

the congressionally authorized military deployment. The president withdrew U.S. forces from Lebanon less than four months later.

Rather than being motivated by a desire to control – or even by a belief that it could control – presidential power, Hall suggests that Congress explicitly ratified and continued to support the president’s increasingly costly and unpopular military initiative for an altogether different reason:

The interaction between Congress and the President in mid-1983 might have been induced by a recognition by Congress that it was being squeezed out of any policy-making role by the interaction of two presidential powers, the power to conduct foreign affairs and the power to command the armed forces. (151)

According to Hall, it was this struggle for a voice in making policy that led Congress to invoke the War Powers Act. In the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution, Congress declared that the requirements of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Act became operative on August 29, 1983. This declaration would require the president to withdraw U.S. forces from Lebanon by the end of October unless he obtained further legislative authorization; this same resolution granted the president such authorization to conduct military operations for eighteen months. Congress’s assertion of its war-making authority under the War Powers Act and its declaration of support for the president’s initiative in a single stroke of legislation can be interpreted as an attempt to maintain at least a nominal policy-making role vis-à-vis the president.

For all the hypotheses and theories proposed in the war powers literature, one common thread seems to tie this diverse collection together: the supposition that both Congress and the executive are motivated by a common desire to protect their

institutional prerogatives. Challenging this assumption could help to alleviate the stalemate into which the war powers debate seems to have settled. This study expands the terms of the debate by incorporating advances made in another area of study – the study of legislative behavior.

LEGISLATIVE BEHAVIOR: *THE LOGIC OF CONGRESSIONAL ACTION*

For the most part, the war powers literature fails to address why individual members of Congress act as they do. Instead, most authors seem to assume that institutional biases guide members in a continuous struggle with the executive for control of military and foreign policy. Douglas Arnold (1990) offered a model of congressional action that, if applied to relevant cases, holds the potential to fill this void in the war powers literature. Arnold assumed that the primary motivation for members was the desire to win reelection.³ His theory revolves around the notion of 'potential preferences;' that members of Congress take into account not only the actual policy preferences of attentive publics but also the potential preferences of *inattentive* publics. In other words, members must first estimate citizens' preferences for each policy decision they face, then estimate the likelihood that citizens might incorporate such preferences into their evaluations of candidates on election day.

Although the vast majority of constituents may be "inattentive" with respect to any particular issue, and may not have solidly formed preferences at any given time, a member ignores these potential preferences at his or her own peril. To estimate potential preferences, Arnold suggested that members must weigh the incidence of costs and benefits and consider the clarity of the causal chain connecting him or her with any perceived policy effect. Both elements are important to a member's electoral calculations. Inattentive publics are more likely to become aroused if high group costs are suddenly imposed upon them than if a proposed benefit is denied to them. Likewise, a challenger can more easily blame a member who outwardly sponsors a tax increase than

³ See Mayhew 1974 for a classic explication of the electoral thesis; Mayhew treats congressmen as

one who simply votes to approve a bill containing a tax increase that emerges from a conference committee. According to Arnold, these two factors together determine whether a member will vote ‘yea’ or ‘nay’ on any given policy proposal.

Nothing happens in Congress without compromise, and compromise results only from the hard work of coalition leaders. *The Logic of Congressional Action* that Arnold developed applies not only to rank and file members, but also to these coalition leaders. The strategy or strategies used by coalition leaders depends – for obvious reasons – on the same factors that affect individual members’ policy decisions: the incidence of costs and benefits and the clarity of the causal chain connecting a member to perceived policy effects. Strategies of persuasion involve changing the shape of members’ or publics’ (attentive or inattentive) policy preferences. Strategies of modification change the shape of policy proposals to conform better to members’ or citizens’ preferences, whether potential or actual. Finally, procedural strategies structure legislative procedures such that it is more difficult to trace costs associated with perceived policy effects back to members.

Arnold successfully applied his *Logic* to three long-term U.S. policy issues: economic policy, tax policy and energy policy. For example, his model is able to explain how coalition leaders and members were able to impose and support an increasingly complicated and cumbersome tax code and then suddenly turn around and slash taxes, double the deficit, and still keep their jobs. By raising taxes during national crises, they persuaded citizens that the increases were necessary and in their best interests. By

“single-minded reelection seekers.”

allowing tax credits in lieu of direct subsidy programs, they modified proposals to conform better to citizens' preferences. In addition, by having the president ask for and rationalize a massive tax cut in the interests of economic recovery, they transferred responsibility for future adverse economic effects to the president (Chapter 8).

While Arnold's theory nicely explains legislative behavior when applied to his three cases, nobody has yet applied it to questions of war and peace – to policy questions involving committing our armed forces to hostilities abroad. A successful application of this theory to such policy would have to explain for example, how members and congressional leaders arranged the legislative process such that they could plausibly avert responsibility if the deployment went badly. Such an application would also have to explain how members and leaders either persuaded constituents that the policy was necessary or desirable, or modified the policy such that it would conform to constituents' expressed or potential preferences. This study will address these questions by applying Arnold's *Logic of Congressional Action* to the politics of military policy in two cases: the multinational force in Lebanon in 1983 and the liberation of Kuwait in 1991.

CONGRESS AND WAR-MAKING: A NEW APPROACH

The Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (1983) and the Authorization to Use Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (herein referred to as the Persian Gulf War Resolution, 1991) are both examples of Congress explicitly authorizing presidential military initiatives that clearly involved U.S. forces in hostilities. In both cases, circumstances forced Congress to either act or see its foreign policy-making role diminished. Both initiatives also took place at approximately the same period in the presidential election cycle during the president's first term. Several differences, however, also distinguish the two cases. In Lebanon, the mission was peacekeeping; in Kuwait, it was war making. In the former, U.S. interests and objectives were not clearly defined and the public did not greatly support the president's initiative; in the latter, the president clearly proclaimed interests and objectives and public opinion favored the use of force.⁴ Reagan's initiative took place during the height of the Cold War while Bush's occurred only months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Finally, the former was prolonged, produced more casualties than were anticipated, and was generally considered an unsuccessful application of U.S. military power to support foreign policy objectives; the latter was short, glorious, and overwhelmingly successful.

While several differences distinguish the two cases, Lebanon and Iraq are appropriate cases for this study because they highlight instances where Congress had the opportunity to deliberate in earnest. After all, Congress is a deliberative institution; this study aims to examine how members of Congress behave during the deliberative process. Although presidents have committed troops abroad in many instances since the passage

⁴ Public opinion always favored the use of force to free U.S. hostages. See *The Gallup Poll*:

of the War Powers Act, in most of those instances Congress was forced to take reactionary measures and was not permitted to deliberate. For example, Reagan's invasion of Grenada in 1983 was so sudden and brief, the operation was completed and troops withdrawn before Congress had a chance to act. In the case of Lebanon that same year, however, Congress debated sharply for a week before deciding to authorize the President to strengthen U.S. presence in that country. Likewise, Congress debated for several days in 1991 before approving the Persian Gulf War Resolution authorizing the President to commit U.S. forces to hostilities against Iraq. In these two cases, then, Congress fulfilled the role of representative deliberation requisite to studying legislative behavior as I have stated it.

I use Howard's (1978) study of presidential decision-making in instances of undeclared war as a model for the present study. Howard adopted some modified techniques of decision-making analysis, based on the idea that governmental activity is performed by people and that understanding their action requires our viewing the world from their perspective (20). This methodology "provides a common focus for the analysis of otherwise disparate political actors, situations and processes" (Rosenau 1967, 195). Howard's research question differs only slightly from the one posed here: "why have presidents decided on undeclared war," versus "why has Congress acquiesced to presidential military initiatives" (16). Howard assumed that the sole decision-maker is the president himself, whereas I presume each member of Congress is a decision-maker in either supporting or opposing the president's initiative. Arnold's *Logic of*

Congressional Action is in essence a decision-making model. Instead of empirically analyzing the perceptual basis for legislative decisions, however, Arnold assumed that one simple rule – electoral calculation – guides members’ decisions. Howard, on the other hand, established a perceptual framework to explore why decision-makers act the way they do. Howard’s framework, therefore, is particularly well suited to exploring the applicability of Arnold’s model to the politics of military policy.

An analysis of how members perceived their decision-making environment has the potential to either support or refute Arnold’s thesis (see Section 6, *Independent Variables*). I conducted a content analysis of members’ statements in the *Congressional Record* to determine their perceptions in authorizing presidential military initiatives in 1983 and 1991. I examined how members of Congress perceived each of twelve variables I adopted from Howard, including perceptions of roles, interests, objectives, settings and circumstances (domestic and international). In addition, I added five content-specific (non-perceptual) variables that are particularly relevant to the war powers subject matter to augment Howard’s perceptual approach.

Content analysis is a method that seems particularly well suited to examining members’ perceptions and attitudes. Political scientists studying electoral politics and media effects have employed content analysis for years with impressive results (see for example Lowry 1974; Gans 1979; Iyengar and Kinder 1987).⁵ In fact, many scholars in the war powers field examine the content of written and spoken communications, but not necessarily in a systematic or quantitative way. The incorporation of a quantitative

analytic scheme offers the ability to move beyond the realm of the descriptive and the hypothetical and allows the systematic analysis of individual behavior (Lasswell 1949). Of course it would be ideal to be able to analyze not only members' official communications but also their utterances off the record (See Fenno 1978 for such a study). However, an analysis of members' statements in the *Congressional Record* is sufficient for the purposes of this study – an examination of members' expressed public perceptions and attitudes. As Kingdon (1989) explained, members of Congress often decide their votes first, and explain them to their constituents later (47-48). In this light, statements made on the floor of Congress can be seen as justifications for the decisions members have already made regarding specific proposals. Because potential challengers easily can exploit an incumbent's floor statement in the *Congressional Record*, members' statements must satisfactorily explain their decisions to constituents. Content analysis of members' statements, therefore, has the potential to provide significant analytic leverage for examining legislative behavior.

While the unit of analysis in this study is the individual member of Congress, the unit of observation is the members' statement in the *Record*. Although my using the *Record* may draw questions regarding the validity of that publication as a source of data, my using it in this study is quite appropriate. The *Congressional Record* has been criticized because it is not an absolute verbatim report of House and Senate proceedings.⁶

⁵ These works are by no means a representative sample of the referenced literature, but serve well to demonstrate the flexible applicability of content analysis to political science.

⁶ The *Journal* of each house, per the Constitution, is the official record of each house's proceedings. The Constitution (Art.I, Sec. 5, cl. 3.) requires that each house publish its proceedings

Statute and precedent allow members to revise and extend their remarks in the *Record*, and to include extraneous matter not uttered on the chamber floor. The *Record* generally indicates such material clearly, however, and I do not use it in this study. Furthermore, U.S. courts have a long-standing precedent of referring to the *Record* and to legislative histories when determining congressional intent (Mantel 1959).

Although it is reassuring to know that the courts, daily in judging many civil matters, regard the *Record* as a valid source of intent and perception, I do not rest my justification for its use on this fact alone. While it is well documented that much politicking occurs out of open debate, the importance of what is reflected in the *Record* to members is evident from a cursory reading.⁷ The *Congressional Record*, therefore, is an appropriate source of data for the purposes of this study. The sampling frame includes all statements related to and made during consideration of the aforementioned resolutions. In total, I selected a stratified sample of 100 statements: for each year, forty rank and file members and ten coalition leaders.⁸ See Appendix A for a more in-depth description of the sampling process and for a list of statements sampled.

"excepting such parts as may in their judgments require secrecy...." The *Record* is the published proceedings of both houses.

⁷ Members often refer to the *Record* by name on the floor when emphasizing points, e.g., "so that my position is clearly indicated in the *Record*." Furthermore, members often read statements on the floor that they later repeat elsewhere or publish in another source. For example, Representative Stephen J. Solarz's speeches of 11 and 12 January 1991 on the House floor (see the *Congressional Record*, 11-12 January, Vol. 137, No. 6, 313-314 and 479) were substantially an extended summary of an essay he published in the January 7 and 14, 1991, issue of *The New Republic* under the title "The Stakes in the Gulf."

⁸ Coalition leaders are defined here as the presiding officer, majority and minority leaders, majority and minority whips, and ranking majority and minority members of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations committees in the House and Senate, respectively.

THE CODING SCHEME: DEPENDENT VARIABLES

Although I adopt most of the dependent variables in this study from Howard, the methodology I employ is quite different. Whereas Howard's method was purely qualitative,⁹ the method I use comprises both qualitative and quantitative elements. For this study, the unit of analysis is the individual member; the unit of observation is the member's statement in its entirety. After reading the statement once through in its entirety, I coded the content of each of the seventeen items on the primary codesheet (see Appendix B). Most items offer a dyadic choice; I coded each item based on the option that is most prevalent in the statement. For example, a statement may suggest briefly that the president and Congress are coequal partners in government, but then may continue to emphasize how Congress should be subservient and follow the president's leadership. In such an instance, I would code the statement president "predominant" (*position*), not "coequal."

Next, I read each paragraph in the statement, one at a time. After reading each paragraph through, I went through each option under the seventeen items and recorded whether I could reasonably infer each one from the paragraph (see Appendix C). For example, a single paragraph may argue a constitutional justification for a policy position while inferring that the president is accountable (under the Constitution) to Congress in matters of war. In such an instance, I would code that paragraph for both options. This process, when completed for all the paragraphs in the statement, allowed me to record the number of paragraphs that reflect each option under each of the seventeen items on the primary codesheet.

⁹ Howard bases his decision theoretic model entirely on the subjective judgements of the coder.

In the end, I may initially code a single item on the primary codesheet as president “predominant,” and may record four paragraphs mentioning that option and five mentioning president “coequal.” The final step in the coding process is similar to the first. After rereading the entire statement through and considering the quantitative data I obtained by coding the paragraphs individually, I made a subjective judgement and recoded each of the seventeen items for the statement’s most prevalent content. See Appendix C for an excerpt from the *Congressional Record* and a corresponding sample coded text.

Thus, while the coding scheme I employ in this study reaps the benefits of quantitative methodology, it ultimately relies on qualitative judgements. This is not a weakness of the design, however – rather, it is a definite strength. While it is inherently more difficult to build reliability into qualitative methodologies than it is to do so with quantitative ones,¹⁰ the hybrid method I use here boosts reliability while encouraging high content validity. An inter-coder reliability check involving two sets of graduate student coders each coding two statements yielded impressive results: coefficients of reliability of .53 and .59 on the first document coded and .77 and .94 on the second.¹¹

See Howard, Chapter 2.

¹⁰ Certainly qualitative methodologies can be made extremely reliable and quantitative methodologies can be completely unreliable; generally speaking, however, a method guided by a well-structured quantitative routine is more reliable than one solely dependent upon subjective judgements of the researcher (See Lasswell 1949).

¹¹ The significant increase in reliability from the first document to the second reflects the coders’ learning experience from coding the first document. See Holsti, 1969 (139-14) for an explanation of this measure of reliability.

Role Variables

Role variables are designed to code the subject's expressed perception of Congress's decision-making authority in comparison with that of the president. The role variables I use in this study are president's *position* ("predominant" or "subordinate") vis-à-vis Congress and the president's *relationship* ("accountable" or "autonomous") with Congress.

President's Position in Relation to Congress: The subject's perception of the president's significance in comparison with that of Congress. A "subordinate" position indicates the subject's perception of the president's role as one being subservient to Congress, while a "predominant" position indicates one being superior to Congress. A "coequal" position indicates the subject's perception of the president and Congress being equal partners, with neither one playing a superior or subordinate role with respect to the other. For example, a subject may refer to the president as the legitimate conductor of the nation's foreign policy ("predominant"), or to the Congress as the true trustee of the will of the people ("subordinate").

President's Relationship with Congress: The subject's perception of the president's association with Congress. An "accountable" relationship indicates a subject's perception of the president as being responsible to Congress, while an "autonomous" relation indicates a perception of the president free to act independent of congressional constraint. If a subject states that the president must ask Congress for permission to begin hostilities, I code the item "accountable." If a subject states that

Congress should stay out of the president's way and let him conduct policy, I code the item "autonomous."

Decision Variables

I include decision variables to code the subject's explicit perception regarding his or her consideration of the proposed resolution. The decision variables are the relative *necessity* of military action ("avoidable" or "imperative") and the *justification* perceived for taking or not taking such action ("moral" or "constitutional").

Necessity of Military Action: The subject's perception of the appropriateness of employing military force in Lebanon or Iraq (in 1983 or 1991, respectively). An "avoidable" option indicates a subject's perception of acceptable alternatives to military force, while an "imperative" option indicates a perception of great necessity for such force. For example, a subject may indicate that alternative options to force have not been explored ("avoidable"), or that all other alternatives have failed leaving one option ("imperative").

Justification for Position: The subject's perception of the justifiability of employing military force in the situation. A "moral" justification indicates a subject's perception of ethical rationale for employing (or not employing) military force, while a "constitutional" justification indicates a perception of legal authority for resorting (or not resorting) to such force. "Other" justification indicates any other grounds perceived for employing or for not employing military force.

Situation Variables

Situation variables code the subject's explicit perception of the incidents leading to Congress's consideration of military action. They include the general *nature* of the crisis ("threatening" to U.S. interests or "inviting" for U.S. interests) and the *urgency* of the situation ("immediate" versus "remote").

Nature of Crisis: A subject's perception of the nature of the crisis with respect to national interests. A "threatening" situation indicates a subject's perception of a situation menacing to national interests, while an "inviting" situation indicates a situation that could be advantageous to national interests. For example, a subject may perceive a situation as threatening to unravel a fragile U.S. alliance ("threatening"), or as offering an opportunity to solidify such alliance ("inviting").

Urgency of Action: The subject's perception of the urgency of the crisis. "Immediate" timing indicates a subject's perception suggesting prompt action in the nation's response while "remote" timing indicates a perception suggesting delayed action in such response. If a subject suggests that the nation should pause and consider its options, the timing is "remote." If a subject suggests that swift action is required to avoid further detriment, the timing is "immediate."

Values Variables

Values variables code the subject's perception of the principle norms guiding his or her decision-making process. The values variables in this study are proper U.S. policy

goals (“expansive” or “retractive”) and of the *means* most appropriate to achieve them (“combative” or “pacific”).

Proper U.S. Policy Goals: The subject’s perception of the objectives that U.S. policy should most appropriately pursue in the situation. “Retractive” goals indicate a subject’s value perceptions directed toward a withdrawal from current positions in U.S. policy, while “expansive” goals indicate perceptions directed toward an extension of such positions. A suggestion that the U.S. should commit more troops to the situation indicates “expansive” goals, while a suggestion that the U.S. should bring its troops home represents “retractive” goals.

Means Appropriate to Achieve Goals: The subject’s perception of methods most appropriate to the implementation of policy in the situation. “Combative” means indicate a subject’s perceptions oriented toward belligerent methods in policy implementation, while “pacific” means would those oriented toward peaceable methods. If a subject talks about pursuing economic solutions, I code the item “pacific.” If a subject suggests that troops should be used, I code the item “combative.”

Setting Variables

Setting variables are included in this study to capture the subject’s expressed perception of general circumstances external to the United States having relevance to the president’s military initiative. The setting variables are the *condition* of the international environment (“changing” or “stable”) and the international *circumstances* (“favorable” or “resistive” to military action).

Condition of International Environment: The subject's perception of any aspect of international relations pertaining to the president's policy in the situation. A "changing" condition indicates a subject's perception of the setting as being essentially flexible concerning the policy, while a "stable" condition indicates one as being essentially fixed concerning such policy. This item aims to capture the subject's perception of the level of stability of world politics. A reference to rapidly growing threats to U.S. security would indicate a "changing" condition, while a reference to long-standing friendly relations with Western Europe would indicate a "stable" condition.

Prospect: The subject's perception of any international consequences arising from the implementation of the president's policy in the situation. An "adverse" circumstance indicates a subject's perception of a setting as being primarily resistive to the implementation of the president's policy, while a "favorable" circumstance indicates one as being primarily supportive of such policy. For example, if a subject perceives that the proposed military action will likely cause a collapse of allied resolve, the prospect is "adverse." If one perceives that such action will endear the U.S. to a country that historically demonstrates enmity to the U.S., the prospect is "favorable."

Domestic Variables

Conversely, domestic variables aim to capture the subject's perception of any circumstances internal to the United States bearing upon the president's military initiative. They are public *opinion* on the policy ("supportive" or "opposed") and public *interest* ("aroused" or "apathetic") in the policy.

Public Opinion: The subject's perception of domestic attitudes concerning the president's policy towards the situation. An "opposing" opinion would indicate a subject's perception disclosing domestic resistance to executive policy, while a "supportive" opinion would indicate perceptions disclosing domestic approval of such policy.

Public Interest: The subject's perception of domestic concern relative to the existence of the situation. "Apathetic" interest would indicate a subject's perception of domestic indifference to the situation, while "aroused" interest would indicate perception of domestic agitation over the situation.

Non-Perceptual Variables

In addition to the above perceptual variables adopted and modified from Howard, I include five content-specific variables that are particularly relevant to the war powers cases. I coded each statement for the subject's characterization of the *President* and *Congress* (five-point scales from "very negative" to "very positive") and the subject's assessment of the president's *policy* in the situation (on the same five-point scale). Finally, I coded statements for reflections on *past* military experiences ("emulate" or "repudiate"), and references to the *War Powers Act* ("favorable" or "unfavorable").

Characterization of President: The subject's general attitude toward the (then) current president. The president may or may not be identified in the statement by name. The subject may refer to him indirectly through reference to an executive department or to his Administration. This item does not aim to capture the subject's attitude towards

the president's specific policy regarding Lebanon or Iraq (in 1983 and 1991 respectively), but rather the expressed attitude towards the president himself. I coded the subject's attitude as "Very Positive," "Positive," "Both Positive and Negative," "Negative," or "Very Negative."

Characterization of Congress: The subject's general attitude toward the (then) current Congress. The Congress may or may not be identified in the statement by name. The subject may refer to Congress as an institution (e.g., "the Congress, or "this body") or indirectly through its component parts (committees, chambers, et cetera). I coded the subject's attitude as "Very Positive," "Positive," "Both Positive and Negative," "Negative," or "Very Negative."

Assessment of President's Policy: The subject's attitude toward the president's policy of employing military force in Lebanon or Iraq (in 1983 or 1991, respectively). The president's policy may or may not be identified directly. The subject may refer to it indirectly through reference to a real or expected effect of that policy. This item does not aim to capture the subject's general attitude towards the president. I coded the subject's attitude as "Very Positive," "Positive," "Both Positive and Negative," "Negative," or "Very Negative."

Reflection upon Past Military Experiences: The subject's appeal to past experiences of military implementation of U.S. policy goals. "Emulation" indicates that the subject believes Congress should act as it did in a similar situation. "Repudiation" indicates that the subject believes Congress should act contrary to the way it did in a similar situation. For example, if a subject recounted how the country stood firm against

the Warsaw Pact for forty years without going to war, I coded the item “emulate.” If a subject warned against allowing the country to get bogged down in another Vietnam, I coded the item “repudiate.”

War Powers Act: Tone of the subject’s reference to the War Powers Act (if any). An “unfavorable” reference indicates that the subject believes the War Powers Act to be ineffectual, unconstitutional, defunct or inapplicable to the situation. A “favorable” reference indicates that the subject believes the War Powers Act to be appropriate, necessary or tailored to the situation.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND EXPECTATIONS

Based on the objectives of this study, I found four independent variables that are most likely to affect members' perceptions, impressions, and actions: *party identification*, *leadership role*, *house*, and *year*. Arnold in his framework specifically called for an analysis of both *party identification* and *leadership role*. I include *house* not because Arnold deemed it important, but rather because he ignored it. The different perceptions of members in the two houses, especially in the realm of foreign policy (where the Senate has traditionally played a greater role than the House), may reveal potentially interesting relationships that Arnold otherwise would not have discovered. Finally, I include *year* simply to differentiate between the two cases. I run all four independent variables against each of the seventeen dependent variables.

Party identification: Party identification is an important variable in any contemporary model of congressional action (Rhode 1994; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Ward 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Rohde 1991; Cox and McCubbins 1991). In both cases, Lebanon and Iraq, members were forced to make a recorded roll call vote on a proposal that was likely to deliver only very general late-order benefits with a good possibility of imposing high early-order group costs. In addition, members could expect large inattentive publics to become aroused if they experienced such costs (e.g., should military action drag out and produce a large number of casualties). According to Arnold's framework, I would expect members in such a scenario to shy away from these proposals.

Of course we know that for whatever reason most members supported the presidents' initiatives in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf. According to Arnold's party

performance rule, constituents who are not pleased with some policy effect of governmental action blame and punish the governing party – the party that controls the presidency¹² – on Election Day. Arnold would therefore expect that Republican members would try to separate themselves from their Republican president lest the party's performance guide constituents next time at the polls (41-42). As support of this, I might expect to find Republicans expressing “negative” attitudes towards the president and his policy, speaking of the need to “delay” military action, and expressing preferences for “pacific” rather than “combative” means.

Distancing oneself from the party, however, forces constituents to focus their attention specifically on the member's own performance (as contrasted with that of the party). The fear that drives members to consider the potential preferences of inattentive publics, according to Arnold, is that such publics will become aroused and evaluate the member's personal performance with the incumbent performance rule (46). The incumbent performance rule, though, requires constituents to both notice a significant policy effect, and to be able to trace those effects back to the individual member. I might therefore expect members to perceive the president as the “predominant” partner in government, or perhaps as “coequal” – but not as “subordinate”. I might also expect them to label the president as “autonomous” rather than “accountable” to Congress, and perhaps to make “unfavorable” references to the War Powers Act (which constrains the

¹² Whether it is appropriate to equate the party that controls the presidency with “the governing party” is not relevant. Most citizens who believe in rewarding and punishing the governing party act as if the governing party were the president's party. See also V.O. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Knopf, 1961), 472-480, and Morris P. Fiorina Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 193-211.

powers of the presidency and places responsibility with Congress). Finally, I might expect to find members labeling the situation as “threatening” to national interests as a strategy of persuasion (Arnold, 92-99). Although members of both parties would likely find themselves fearful of a possible reaction by inattentive publics, I expect to find a greater degree of such behavior among “the governing party” – the Republicans.

Leadership role: Where you stand depends on where you sit. Another intuitive variable, members in leadership roles do not necessarily have the same interests as members of the rank and file. In addition, members occupying such roles do not have the luxuries of distancing themselves from the party, avoiding action on a policy issue, or remaining silent while the president or some other group enacts irresponsible or unpopular legislation. While the Speaker of the House obviously cannot pretend to be ignorant or blameless for his party’s policies and performance, neither can the chairman of the Ways and Means Committee eschew responsibility for a drastic change in the tax code. The members I consider in this study to occupy leadership roles are: the Speaker of the House, the majority and minority leaders in each house, the majority and minority whips in each house, and the ranking two majority (including the Chairman) and minority members of the House Foreign Affairs and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.

As coalition leaders, Arnold would expect these members to express themselves in a manner reflecting one or more of the strategies for coalition leaders he describes. For example, if Congress authorizes the president to make a policy decision rather than itself make a decision and direct the president to execute it, such political maneuvering may very well represent a strategy of modification (Arnold, 108-115). Leaders’

references to the president as “coequal” with Congress – *not* as “subordinate” – might be one reflection of such a strategy. Similarly, leaders would likely avoid reference to the president’s “relationship” with Congress: an “autonomous” relationship might indicate an abdication of congressional responsibility, while an “accountable” relationship might bestow upon Congress unwanted responsibility. Leaders’ invocation of “moral” justifications for military action and references to a situation that is “threatening” to national interests may reflect a strategy of persuasion. Furthermore, I might expect appeals to “repudiate” past experiences, like the appeasement of Hitler at Munich, or references to a “changing,” unstable international environment to reflect such a strategy.

House: Arnold made no differentiation between Representatives and Senators in his model. His primary assumption was that all members of Congress care intensely about reelection, an assumption that seems to work well in the cases he analyzes. Based strictly on Arnold’s model, I have no reason to expect any difference between Representatives and Senators with respect to any of the dependent variables. I will therefore have to explain any relationship I may find between *house* and any of the seventeen dependent variables *outside* of Arnold’s theoretical framework.

The primary difference that would seem to affect the perceptual variables in this study is length of term. Senators, facing reelection three times less often than Representatives, would seem to be less vulnerable to retrospective incumbent performance-based voting than would Representatives. The lesser degree of electoral vulnerability might be reflected in Senators being more willing to associate themselves with their actions and with the president. For example, I may expect to see Senators

more than Representatives have “positive” attitudes towards the president and his policy. Senators, more than Representatives, may also view military action more as “imperative” than as “avoidable.” Finally, Senators may be more willing than Representatives to express their support for “expansive” U.S. policy goals.

Year: The last independent variable I examined in this study is year. The purpose of this variable is to probe for differences in members’ perceptions and beliefs between the two cases. While the two cases used in this study share a number of similarities that facilitate comparison, they also differ in a number of ways that could act to amplify or cloud other relationships (see page 13 of the current study). Significant differences include different missions (peacekeeping versus war making), differently articulated objectives and interests, different levels of public support, and different levels of military and political success. In addition, Reagan’s introduction of forces into Lebanon took place during the Cold War, only a decade after Vietnam, whereas Bush’s DESERT STORM occurred at the end of the Cold War and almost two decades after Vietnam. Accordingly, I tested *year* against each of the seventeen dependent variables discussed earlier.

The first confounding factor that comes to mind is the earlier case’s closer temporal proximity to Vietnam. Congress’s distasteful experience with presidential war making in Southeast Asia likely was more on the minds of members in 1983 than in 1991. In addition, Lebanon was the first major deployment of U.S. troops abroad since

Vietnam.¹³ Therefore, I may expect to find more members perceiving the president as “subordinate” and “accountable” to Congress in 1983 than in 1991. I may also expect to find members raising “constitutional” justifications more often in 1983 than in 1991. Finally, I may expect to see more “favorable” references to the War Powers Act and more appeals to “repudiate” the past in 1983 than in 1991.

In addition, the different missions and different interests the presidents’ articulated to be at stake may lead me to find members supporting “combative” measures more in 1991 and “pacific” measures more in 1983. With interests poorly defined and casualties already suffered in 1983, I might also expect to find members referencing public opinion more “opposed” to military action in Lebanon than in the Persian Gulf.

¹³ Presidents Ford and Carter employed U.S. forces abroad in several instances, but none approached the scope, duration, or magnitude of U.S. participation in the multinational force in Lebanon.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

Although I used both nominal and ordinal level variables in this study, I coded each variable numerically to simplify analysis. All the independent variables and most of the dependent variables employ nominal measures. Five dependent variables use ordinal measures: characterization of the *President*, characterization of *Congress*, assessment of president's *policy*, president's *position* in relation to Congress, and proper U.S. policy *goals*. The first three are five point scalar measures ranging from "very positive" (1) to "very negative" (5). The last two are three point measures across a discernable range of options. The options under president's *position* are arranged as follows: President "predominant" (1), President "coequal" (2), and President "subordinate" (3). Those under policy *goals* are arranged, "expand" initiatives (1), "maintain" initiative (2), and "retract" initiative (3). Those items that are not coded because no relevant mentions appear in the statement are treated as missing data.¹⁴

I cross tabulated every independent variable against each dependent variable. I computed lambda (λ) as a measure of association for each cross-tabulation. For the cross-tabulations involving the five ordinal dependent variables, I also computed gamma (γ) to indicate the direction of the relationship. As a test for statistical significance, I computed chi square (χ^2) for each relationship I examined. While I employed commonly accepted standards of statistical significance in evaluating χ^2 , the relatively small sample

¹⁴ The middle option on each of the five point scales is "both positive and negative" rather than "neither positive nor negative" because it is too difficult to determine whether the lack of mention is meaningful or not. While it may be helpful to know whether a "no mention" code is meaningful, there is no way to determine this with the present data.

size and the prevalence of small-range nominal data necessitated a comprehensive and subjective approach in evaluating observed relationships.¹⁵

TABLE 1
Association And Significance: Party Identification

	<i>Lambda</i> (λ)	<i>Gamma</i> (γ) ^a	<i>Chi Square</i> (χ^2)	<i>Degrees of</i> <i>Freedom</i>
<i>Condition</i>	.000	4.537*	1
<i>Congress</i>	.010	-.023	2.188	5
<i>Goals</i>	.196	-.615	16.783***	2
<i>Interest</i>	.000163	1
<i>Justification</i>	.031	2.560	2
<i>Means</i>	.462	26.903***	1
<i>Nature</i>	.152	6.553*	1
<i>Necessity</i>	.303	11.818***	1
<i>Opinion</i>	.263	5.060	1
<i>Past</i>	.029	2.245	2
<i>Policy</i>	.339	-.653	28.039***	5
<i>Position</i>	.100	-.289	5.052	2
<i>President</i>	.179	-.401	23.135***	5
<i>Prospect</i>	.270	10.225**	1
<i>Relationship</i>	.122	5.237*	1
<i>Urgency</i>	.208	22.257***	1
<i>War Powers</i>	.250	8.566*	1

^aGamma (γ) is only computed for ordinal level independent variables.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .10$

*** $p < .001$

¹⁵ In evaluating the results of the following statistical analyses, I considered not only the flat numerical output, but also the patterns observed in the raw data. For example, I had to be very careful in examining the relationships involving the *leadership role* variable because of the small number of leaders included in the sample.

TABLE 1 illustrates the measures of association and significance for *party identification* and the seventeen dependent variables. I found assessment of the president's *policy* and characterization of the *President* to be moderately associated with *party identification*.¹⁶ Although highly significant, the direction of these relationships is opposite of what Arnold might have expected: Republicans speak well of their president and of his policy. Similarly, I found a strong and highly significant association between *party identification* and *means* appropriate, with Republicans being more "combat" oriented than Democrats – again opposite of what Arnold would predict. In addition, Republicans almost unanimously espouse the need for "immediate" action (*urgency*), whereas Arnold might suggest Republicans would speak more of "delay".¹⁷

These findings are much more intuitive than those that Arnold's theoretical framework might otherwise suggest. In this day of party politics, one must look hard to find an issue important enough to break the vice grip of partisan loyalty.¹⁸ Furthermore, Republicans are typically more hawkish than Democrats. Although one might expect (and hope for) the politics behind committing our armed forces abroad to transcend partisanship, it is not unthinkable that, given such a proposal, Republicans would be more inclined than Democrats to support it.

¹⁶ In evaluating λ and γ , I consider the following as a basic guideline: <1 = small to non-existent relationship; <2 = slight relationship; <3 moderate relationship; <4 moderate to strong relationship; >4 = strong relationship.

¹⁷ The reader should recognize that, although this pattern emerges from the data, no statistical association is observed.

¹⁸ Although the prevalence of party voting has been in decline in the modern era, several scholars have noted a significant resurgence of party loyalty in the last two decades. See Rhode (1990, 1991), Cox and McCubbins (1991) and Ward (1993).

I furthermore found little evidence of a significant relationship between *party identification* and *position, relationship, or war powers*. Although I do not find *party identification* to affect these variables, members as a whole do seem to speak of the president as a “coequal” partner (by a vast majority). With respect to *relationship* and *war powers*, however, it seems that members generally see the president as “accountable” to Congress and generally speak “favorably” of the War Powers Act.¹⁹ Finally, I found that Republicans more often than Democrats view the situation as “threatening,” although members in general also seem to view a “threatening” situation by a margin of 2:1.²⁰

The fact that there is little evidence of differentiation between parties does not necessarily contradict Arnold’s theoretical framework. There is no reason why Democrats would not also wish to separate themselves from a presidential policy that could rouse the sentiments of a large inattentive public – Arnold’s logic simply indicates that members of the president’s party would have added incentive to do so. Members as a group, however, do not conform to these expectations; they behave in the opposite manner. Although the vast majority of members do not view the president as “subordinate” to Congress, there is little reason to believe that members would have otherwise considered the president to occupy such a role. The perception across party lines of a “coequal” but “accountable” president, and widely spread “favorable” impressions of the War Powers Act seem to suggest that members are guided more by institutional biases than by electoral calculations.

¹⁹ 62 out of 77 members label the President as “coequal;” 69 out of 76 refer to him as “accountable;” and 30 out of 38 refer to the War Powers Act favorably.

TABLE 2
Association And Significance: Leadership Role

	<i>Lambda</i> (λ)	<i>Gamma</i> (γ) ^a	<i>Chi Square</i> (χ^2)	<i>Degrees of Freedom</i>
<i>Condition</i>	.000	1.428	1
<i>Congress</i>	.147	-.690	19.510**	5
<i>Goals</i>	.000	-.625	8.472*	2
<i>Interest</i>	.000
<i>Justification</i>	.000	2.796	2
<i>Means</i>	.000	7.178**	1
<i>Nature</i>	.000	1.977	1
<i>Necessity</i>	.062	1.748	1
<i>Opinion</i>	.000376	1
<i>Past</i>	.000145	2
<i>Policy</i>	.024	-.203	2.597	5
<i>Position</i>	.000	.297	1.676	2
<i>President</i>	.091	-.485	10.579	5
<i>Prospect</i>	.000	6.028*	1
<i>Relationship</i>	.040	4.775*	1
<i>Urgency</i>	.000	2.356	1
<i>War Powers</i>	.000	1.649	1

^aGamma (γ) is only computed for ordinal level independent variables.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .10$

*** $p < .001$

TABLE 2 illustrates the measures of association and significance for *leadership role*. The very small number of members in the "leaders" sample complicated analysis of the effects of *leadership role*. Although resource constraints necessitated a small sample, the nature of the legislative process justified division of that sample into even smaller

²⁰ No statistically significant association is found for *nature* of crisis, but the patterns in the data

sub-units (see Appendix A). Although this analysis did not reveal any but a few very weak associations (λ values), the associations noted are nevertheless interesting when examined in conjunction with the patterns evident in the data.

As expected, almost all leaders refer to the president's *position* with Congress as "coequal," and none refer to it as "subordinate."²¹ Similarly, although leaders and rank and file members are not well distinguished with respect to the *nature* of crisis, leaders do overwhelmingly see a crisis as "threatening" to national interests.²² The same applies to reflections on the *past* and to *condition* of international environment. Both leaders and rank and file members overwhelmingly "repudiate" the past, although there is no statistical differentiation between them. Both groups also overwhelmingly see a "changing" international environment – with leaders unanimous on the point.

Again, that leaders and rank and file members are not well distinguished with respect to these four variables does not necessarily detract from the applicability of Arnold's theoretical framework. In fact, Arnold does not suggest that leaders and ordinary members will act differently; indeed the aim of coalition leaders is to encourage the rank and file to fall in behind and in support of his or her preferred policy. That there is no clear differentiation between leaders and other members is not a problem for Arnold's theory.

are apparent.

²¹ 16 "coequal" versus 2 "predominant." γ indicates a positive relationship because a total of 12 rank and file members refer to the President as "predominant" and "subordinate. Any relationship expressed through a λ value is obscured, however because the bulk of members, whether leaders or not, refer to the President as "coequal." This is not inconsistent with Arnold's theoretical framework or with my expected findings.

Contrary to expectations, however, leaders do not avoid reference to the president's *relationship* with Congress. Almost all members – without respect to *leadership role* – refer to the president as “accountable” to Congress. In addition, leaders do not invoke a “moral” *justification* for their positions more than their rank and file colleagues; most members, both occupying and not occupying leadership roles, invoke a “constitutional” *justification*. In fact, rank and file members actually make “moral” argument more often than their coalition leaders do.

The fact that leaders do not attempt to disguise their roles in approving the president's military initiative with “moral” arguments or by not referring to their *relationship* with the president can cause some problems for Arnold's model. For Arnold, coalition leaders are key players in policy-making, and they must do what they can to blur the association of individual members with early-order policy effects. Again, references to the president as “accountable” and the offering of “constitutional” arguments for policy positions seem not to obscure, but to emphasize one's institutional loyalties and prerogatives.

A cursory glance at TABLE 3 reveals that Arnold's implicit assumption of homogeneity among members of Congress does not hold across each of the dependent variables presented in this study.²³ Specifically, policy *goals*, *justification* for position, assessment of president's *policy*, and characterization of the *President* seem to cause

²² There is no discernable statistical relationship between *leadership role* and *nature* of crisis, but leaders and rank and file members all generally see the crisis as threatening to national interests.

²³ This is not surprising; Arnold's incidental dismissal of the bicameral nature of the legislature was likely a conscious one, and probably reflected a desire for simplicity in his model.

problems for Arnold.²⁴ Of these, I previously identified three: characterization of the *President*, assessment of president's *policy*, and *policy goals*.

TABLE 3
Association And Significance: House

	<i>Lambda</i> (λ)	<i>Gamma</i> (γ) ^a	<i>Chi Square</i> (χ^2)	<i>Degrees of Freedom</i>
<i>Condition</i>	.000518	1
<i>Congress</i>	.011	-.099	6.980	5
<i>Goals</i>	.000	.371	4.781	2
<i>Interest</i>	.000381	1
<i>Justification</i>	.013	15.902***	2
<i>Means</i>	.000342	1
<i>Nature</i>	.000060	1
<i>Necessity</i>	.000753	1
<i>Opinion</i>	.000000	1
<i>Past</i>	.000559	2
<i>Policy</i>	.153	.291	18.652**	5
<i>Position</i>	.000	.221	.888	2
<i>President</i>	.206	.086	23.484***	5
<i>Prospect</i>	.000117	1
<i>Relationship</i>	.000	1.862	1
<i>Urgency</i>	.000	1.936	1
<i>War Powers</i>	.080	1.293	1

^aGamma (γ) is only computed for ordinal level independent variables.

* $p < .05$

** $p < .10$

*** $p < .001$

²⁴ These are the relationships are statistically significant.

Although I correctly identified these three variables as potential trouble spots in Arnold's framework, I incorrectly identified the directions of those relationships. Senators are not more likely to approve of the *president* and his *policy* than are Representatives; in fact, the opposite is true.²⁵ I also incorrectly predicted the relationship between *house* and *policy goals*: Senators are not more supportive of expanding U.S. policy *goals* than are Representatives, rather the opposite is true.²⁶ Furthermore, I found no statistical support for the suggestion that Senators espouse greater *necessity* for military action than Representatives do. One unanticipated association emerged, however: a slight but highly significant relationship between *justification* and *house*. Whereas Representatives are about evenly split on offering "moral" or "constitutional" justifications for their positions, Senators almost exclusively offer "constitutional" arguments.

The unanticipated association between *house* and *justification* makes sense given my earlier explanation for the three relationships I predicted incorrectly: that Senators are better insulated with a six-year term and thus do not need to 'hide' behind "moral" justifications. Although this argument seems to hold for this relationship, it does not hold for the other three. A better and more plausible rationale exists that satisfactorily explains all four relationships. Although both the House of Representatives and the Senate have standing committees in place dedicated specifically to the nation's foreign affairs, only the Senate shares concurrent constitutional responsibilities with the president

²⁵ These are small to moderate associations, but highly significant.

²⁶ Representatives are more than twice as likely to support expansion than retraction whereas Senators are about evenly split.

in areas of foreign policy. The Senate historically has therefore liberally exercised and jealously guarded its constitutional prerogatives in this arena. The relationships observed here, then, relate to the more lengthy term of Senators. Indeed, the founders of the Constitution intended for the lengthy term of the Senate to provide continuity and considered deliberation to the young nation's foreign policy (See Madison, *The Federalist*, Nos. 62 and 63). Reflecting on this, it is understandable that Senators are more likely than Representatives to express reservations regarding the president's military *policy* and that they are less supportive of expanding U.S. policy *goals*. This explanation also makes it more clear why Senators espouse less of a *necessity* for military action, and that they more often offer "constitutional" justifications for their positions. The relationships revealed here again seem to point not to members guided by electoral concerns, but by institutional jealousies and competition.

TABLE 4 illustrates measures of association and significance across the two cases: measures for the final independent variable, *year*. Although there is no statistical association between *year* and *position*, more members referred to the president as "coequal" or "subordinate" in 1983 than did in 1991.²⁷ In addition, a slightly larger number of members perceived the president as "accountable" to Congress in 1983 than in 1990; whereas in 1983 very few members saw the president as "autonomous," in 1991 the number sextupled.²⁸ The relationship between *year* and *justification* is a robust one that mirrors expectations: the number of members offering "constitutional" versus

²⁷ There is no statistical association because the pattern is the same for both years; in absolute numbers, however, more members thought of the President as "coequal" and "subordinate" in 1983 than in 1991.

“moral” justifications almost reverses from 1983 to 1991, with the former style dominant in 1983. These relationships – especially the latter – seem to support expectations based on the temporal contexts of the two cases.

TABLE 4
Association And Significance: Year

	<i>Lambda</i> (λ)	<i>Gamma</i> (γ) ^a	<i>Chi Square (χ^2)</i>	<i>Degrees of Freedom</i>
<i>Condition</i>	.120	3.539	1
<i>Congress</i>	.260	.436	24.007***	5
<i>Goals</i>	.181	-.557	13.523**	2
<i>Interest</i>	.250	1.905	1
<i>Justification</i>	.265	20.182***	2
<i>Means</i>	.000938	1
<i>Nature</i>	.246	15.506***	1
<i>Necessity</i>	.099	2.127	1
<i>Opinion</i>	.200000	1
<i>Past</i>	.231559	2
<i>Policy</i>	.177	-.520	15.416**	5
<i>Position</i>	.020	.026	1.686	2
<i>President</i>	.086	-.232	7.162	5
<i>Prospect</i>	.066	2.361	1
<i>Relationship</i>	.144	4.232*	1
<i>Urgency</i>	.040	1.012	1
<i>War Powers</i>	.000	1.293	1

^aGamma (γ) is only computed for ordinal level independent variables.

* p<.05

** p<.10

*** p<.001

²⁸ This relationship is evident in the data, but it is only barely significant to the .10 level.

Also partially conforming to expectations, members made more appeals to "repudiate" the past and many more appeals to the War Powers Act (three to four times as many "favorable" as "unfavorable") in 1983 than in 1991.²⁹ Although fewer members advocated "combative" means in 1983, apparently conforming to expectations, the number supporting "pacific" measures remained unchanged between the two cases. The result is that no significant relationship emerges from the *means* data. Similarly, I can draw no conclusions from the *opinion* data because there are too few valid opinion codes.³⁰

Unexpected relationships I observed include those with characterization of *Congress*, *policy goals*, *nature* of crisis, and assessment of president's *policy*. I found a moderate and highly significant positive relationship between *year* and characterization of *Congress*. This suggests that members thought better of themselves in 1983 than in 1991. A glance at the data reveals that the relationship takes its force from the fact that very few members spoke ill of Congress in 1991.³¹ I find a similar relationship between *year* and *policy goals*: a slight negative relationship that also is significant. Twice as many members supported expanding U.S. *goals* in 1991 as in 1983, and almost four times fewer supported retracting them. The relationship I found between *year* and *nature* of crisis suggests that many more members perceived the crisis in 1991 to be

²⁹ The association for the *past* is moderate, and is evidenced in the data, but is not very significant at all; there is no association for *war powers* because the proportions of favorable and unfavorable references in each year are comparable. The shear bulk of *war powers* references in 1983 does not conform to, but neither is it inconsistent with, this researcher's expectations.

³⁰ Only 26 valid codes for *opinion*; only 8 valid codes for *interest*. Members simply did not refer much to public opinion or to public interest.

³¹ Eighteen members characterized Congress positively and fifteen characterized it negatively in 1983; fourteen characterized that body positively in 1991 with only three characterizing it negatively.

“threatening” to national interests than perceived the crisis in 1983 to be threatening.³²

Finally, the relationship I observed between *year* and assessment of the president’s *policy* is slight, but significant. While members assessed the president’s policy about evenly in 1983, the balance in 1991 fell much more in favor of it.

Individually, it is difficult to concoct any kind of credible rationale for these unexpected observed relationships. Taken together, however, at least one reasonable explanation suggest itself. In Lebanon, Congress did not attempt to get involved in the president’s military policy until after he already had troops abroad engaged in hostilities and sustaining casualties. While it may have been tempting for Congress to blame the president alone for the ailing Lebanese peacekeeping mission, the renunciation of congressional authority required to do so may have been too great a price for Congress to pay. In other words, blaming the president outright and demanding that he bring the troops home would raise questions about why Congress didn’t get involved in the earlier stages of the deployment.³³ Leaders in Congress consulted with the president at most stages of the Persian Gulf deployment and made it clear to him and to the American people that Congress would need to be involved in any decision to commence hostilities. In addition, the mission in the Gulf was not peacekeeping; it was war making against a visible and clearly threatening enemy. The juxtaposition of these circumstances can help explain members speaking badly about Congress in ‘83 but not in ‘91; supporting

³² This relationship is also moderate in strength but highly significant.

³³ Although the President reported to Congress on two instances at the beginning of the operation, Congress did not take those opportunities to assert its authority and stop the action before it got out of hand.

expansion of goals in '91 and retraction in '83; viewing a more threatening crisis in '91 than in '83; and much more positively assessing the president's policy in '91 than in '83.

DISCUSSION

This study has demonstrated one thing very clearly: members of Congress, when deciding matters of war and peace, are not motivated solely – or even primarily – by a desire to maintain institutional prerogatives. It is evident that members look at many factors when deciding what role to play when the president proposes or begins a military initiative abroad. Although the institutional war powers literature captures an important aspect of legislative-executive relations, at the same time it generally misses a factor critical to any study of legislative behavior: the electoral connection.

At least as important as institutional considerations in members' decision-making processes are the motivations provided by the perpetual desire to win reelection. Akin to any animal's primal survival instinct, most legislators also possess a survival instinct of sorts; a member of Congress who cannot win reelection cannot accomplish any of his or her other legislative goals. According to Arnold, members go about maintaining their seats by avoiding blame for bad policy outcomes, regardless of whether that outcome can be rightly attributed to them. It is this fear of blame, Arnold says, that drives members to attempt to blur the causal links between themselves and some anticipated cost that a new policy may place upon constituents. This logic seems to hold true, at least to some degree, to the cases examined in this study as well.

The problem with viewing legislative behavior as being driven by institutional loyalties is that doing so ignores the reality that members of Congress have powerful incentives not to get involved in policy-making until they see the outcome. A member may be more inclined to take an open stand on a policy issue that likely will impose few visible costs on a diverse array of constituents than on one that more likely than not will

impose great costs upon select groups of constituents. Although members are typically quick to claim credit for desirable policy outcomes and to eschew responsibility for undesirable ones, the trick is to determine what the outcomes will be before taking a stand (Mayhew 1974). This problem becomes even more defined when applied to questions of war and peace. It is difficult indeed to see what electoral incentive any member of Congress could have to get involved in a decision to sent U.S. troops into harm's way under anything less than the most clear-cut circumstances (e.g., retaliation for an attack on U.S. territory).

The cases of Lebanon and Iraq demonstrate how Congress in a sense abdicated responsibility for committing troops to hostilities. While both the Multinational Forces in Lebanon Resolution and the Persian Gulf War Resolution authorized the president to employ U.S. forces abroad, both also allowed Congress to eschew responsibility in case things started to go badly for U.S. troops. The former declared the activation of the War Powers Act, but turned around and authorized the president to keep troops abroad for another eighteen months if he deemed it necessary. Similarly, the latter declared the applicability of the War Powers Act and then continued to authorize the president to initiate hostilities once he determined that all other peaceful means of enforcing U.N. resolutions had been exhausted. Although institutional factors certainly help illustrate why Congress decided to act at all, electoral incentives best explain the form the approved resolutions ultimately took.

My use of content analysis in this study, while novel with respect to the war powers literature, proved to be quite advantageous. However, an analysis of the

published record using perceptual and attitudinal variables can only hope to capture the perceptions and attitudes that members of Congress *express* while in open debate. As I mentioned earlier, I would have also liked to have analyzed members' utterances off the record (see Section 4, Congress and War Making: A New Approach). Notwithstanding, this methodology allowed me to examine war powers cases from a new perspective: from the view point of individual decision-makers in Congress. Likewise, it offered me a way to explore further Arnold's model of how individual members of Congress make decisions among policy options. Of course this study was not intended to be a test of Arnold's model. Rather, my analysis of member's statements permitted me to expand the war powers literature in a way not previously attempted.

While this study has demonstrated that electoral factors do indeed play a significant role in members' decision-making processes regarding military policy, it has not attempted to generalize to other areas of foreign policy making. Conventional wisdom among political scientists dictates that domestic politics drive the electoral process to a far greater degree than do foreign affairs.³⁴ Nevertheless, it makes sense that involving U.S. forces in hostilities abroad could have significant electoral repercussions for members of Congress. The realization of, or even the mere possibility of American soldiers dying in a foreign land could potentially mobilize even the most inattentive of Arnold's publics. This study suggests that scholars interested in studying legislative

³⁴ For a striking example of this percept, one need only look to George Bush's electoral defeat in 1992. In the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War in 1991, his job approval rating approached an unprecedented 90%; In the months approaching the 1992 general election, Governor Clinton's campaign strategy of attacking Bush's domestic (particularly economic) policy eroded Bush's job approval rating to less than 38%.

decision-making with respect to foreign policy might also wish to explore other areas in which members may consider the electoral factor. Until then, the true strength of the electoral connection to legislative behavior remains unknown.

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APPENDIX A
METHODOLOGY

METHODOLOGY

Data Selection

Congressional discourse surrounding Reagan's deployment of troops to Lebanon and Bush's deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia are both clustered neatly around significant developments in these crises. The *Congressional Record* is used as the primary data source because it contains all congressional floor debates for the time periods in question. This is the most relevant source as the puzzle driving this study is "how do Members of Congress make decisions about foreign policy?" The debate that takes place during open session about foreign policy is therefore of great interest.

Sampling

The unit of observation in this study is the verbal intercourse surrounding congressional decision-making on the subject of committing troops to hostilities abroad. In other words, each Representative's or Senator's statement in open debate counts as a single unit of observation. Obviously not all entries in the *Congressional Record* during the given time frame can be analyzed. A statement is considered relevant data for the purposes of this study if it is recognized as being part of the floor debate relating to congressional consideration of either the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (1983) or the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (1991). For the former, debate taking place between 26 September 29 September 1983 is considered; for the latter, debate taking place between 10 January and 12 January 1991 is considered. These are the dates that the House and Senate considered these respective

resolutions and proposed amendments thereto in open debate. Furthermore, a statement is only considered relevant if it is spoken as part of debate designated for the purpose of consideration of one of the two aforementioned resolutions by the Presiding Officer of the Senate or Speaker of the House.³⁵ This criteria reveals a sampling frame of 183 statements in 1983 and 659 statements in 1991 (available from the author upon request).

From these two frames, a sample of 50 was selected to be coded and analyzed. This number is large enough to ensure a representative sample yet small enough to be manageable for a single researcher. The sampling process used, however, is not strictly an equal probability sampling method. Because statements of the leaders of each house typically carry greater weight than do statements of lesser ranking members, a stratified sample is more appropriate. Twenty percent of each sample (10) is therefore randomly selected from House and Senate leaders.³⁶ The remaining portion of each sample (40) is randomly selected from statements made by Senators and Representatives not occupying leadership roles in their respective houses. The total number of statements analyzed by the researcher is 100 (see attached).

³⁵ Otherwise relevant statements that are not part of the debate specifically considering one of these resolutions or proposed amendments to them are not included in the sampling frame for practical purposes. These exclusions are sporadic and do not significantly affect the integrity of the final sampling frame.

³⁶ The sampling frame for the "leaders" category includes statements made by: the Speaker of the House or President pro tempore; the majority and minority leaders in each house; the majority and minority whips in each house; and the two ranking majority (including the chairman) and minority members of the Foreign Affairs and Foreign Relations committees in the House and Senate, respectively.

TABLE 5

Sample Of 100 Statements: List Of Texts Coded

<i>Name^a</i>	<i>Party ID</i>	<i>Leadership Role?</i>	<i>Date of Record</i>	<i>Page Numbers (Inclusive)</i>
Biden	Democrat	Yes	26 Sep 83	25760-25767
Sarbanes	Democrat	No	26 Sep 83	25767-25776
Ford	Democrat	No	27 Sep 83	25851-25856
Eagleton	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26019-26022
Moynihan	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26023-26027
Sarbanes	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26027
Matsunaga	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26044-26050
Denton	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26050-26051
Zablocki	Democrat	Yes	28 Sep 83	26112-26113
Broomfield	Republican	Yes	28 Sep 83	26113-26114
Fascell	Democrat	Yes	28 Sep 83	26114-26115
Obey	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26117-26118
McCain	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26118
Gilman	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26119
Weiss	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26119-26120
Leach	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26120-26121
Downey	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26122
Huckaby	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26123
Lantos	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26126-26127
Paul	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26127
Lowery	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26128
Studds	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26128
Morrison	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26128
Levine	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26134-26135
Andrews	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26135
Frenzel	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26135-26136
Gaydos	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26138
Boland	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26139
Lent	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26142-26143
Waxman	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26144-26145
Jacobs	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26147-26148
Kemp	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26151-26154
Skelton	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26155-26156
Petri	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26157
Sabo	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26160
Hughes	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26161

TABLE 5 CONTINUED

Sample Of 100 Statements: List Of Texts Coded

<i>Name^a</i>	<i>Party ID</i>	<i>Leadership Role?</i>	<i>Date of Record</i>	<i>Page Numbers (Inclusive)</i>
Winn	Republican	Yes	28 Sep 83	26162
Dickinson	Republican	No	28 Sep 83	26172
Jones	Democrat	No	28 Sep 83	26174
Thurmond	Republican	Yes	29 Sep 83	26259
Nunn	Democrat	No	29 Sep 83	26271
Tsongas	Democrat	No	29 Sep 83	26272-26273
Biden	Democrat	Yes	29 Sep 83	26273
Murkowski	Republican	No	29 Sep 83	26277
DeConcini	Democrat	No	29 Sep 83	26280-26281
Grassley	Republican	No	29 Sep 83	26282
Warner	Republican	No	29 Sep 83	26285-26286
Byrd	Democrat	Yes	29 Sep 83	26291-26294
Baker	Republican	Yes	29 Sep 83	26294-26295
Zablocki	Democrat	Yes	29 Sep 83	26494-26495
Mitchell	Democrat	Yes	10 Jan 91	S101-103
Moynihan	Democrat	No	10 Jan 91	S108-113
Biden	Democrat	Yes	10 Jan 91	S118-122
Gibbons	Democrat	No	10 Jan 91	H119
Neal	Democrat	No	10 Jan 91	H119-120
Wolf	Republican	No	10 Jan 91	H121-122
Molinari	Republican	No	10 Jan 91	H145-146
Gephardt	Democrat	Yes	10 Jan 91	H149-150
Broomfield	Republican	Yes	10 Jan 91	H166-179
Fields	Republican	No	10 Jan 91	H179
Johnston	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	S188-189
Bentson	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	S223-225
Wirth	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	S225-228
Metzenbaum	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	S235-237
Pell	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	S269
Durenberger	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	S309-310
Solomon	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H212
Gilman	Republican	Yes	11 Jan 91	H216-217
Boxer	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	H218-219
Michel	Republican	Yes	11 Jan 91	H219
Skelton	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	H231-232
Rinaldo	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H241-242
Gejdenson	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	H242

TABLE 5 CONTINUED

Sample Of 100 Statements: List Of Texts Coded

<i>Name^a</i>	<i>Party ID</i>	<i>Leadership Role?</i>	<i>Date of Record</i>	<i>Page Numbers (Inclusive)</i>
Fish	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H245-247
Horton	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H249-250
Nichols	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H259-260
Sabo	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	H284
Duncan	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H296
Petri	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H316
Zeliff	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H316
Thomas	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	H321-322
Spence	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H323
Miller	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H323
Fazio	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	H346-348
Taylor	Republican	No	11 Jan 91	H351-352
Savage	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	H364-365
Serrano	Democrat	No	11 Jan 91	H378
Dole	Republican	Yes	12 Jan 91	S366-367
D'Amato	Republican	No	12 Jan 91	S384
Helms	Republican	Yes	12 Jan 91	S387-389
Simpson	Republican	Yes	12 Jan 91	S392
Moynihan	Democrat	No	12 Jan 91	S394-395
Wellstone	Democrat	No	12 Jan 91	S396
Heinz	Republican	No	12 Jan 91	S400-401
Torres	Democrat	No	12 Jan 91	H426-247
Spence	Republican	No	12 Jan 91	H259
Hobson	Republican	No	12 Jan 91	H459
Schaefer	Republican	No	12 Jan 91	H460
Michel	Republican	Yes	12 Jan 91	H476
Hopkins	Republican	No	12 Jan 91	H482

^aNames in boldface are Senators; regular face names are Representatives

APPENDIX B
PRIMARY CODESHEET

<u>VARIABLE DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CODE</u>
Document Code	_____
Date of Record/Testimony/Publication	____/____/____
Page Numbers of Analyzed Text (Start-End)	_____ - _____
Number of Paragraphs Coded	_____
Name of Member	_____
 <u>Party Identification of Member</u>	
1 = Democrat	_____
2 = Republican	_____
 <u>Role of Member</u>	_____
1 = General	_____
2 = Leader	_____
 Roles: President and Congress	
 1. <u>Characterization of President:</u>	Initial Content _____
Mentions	Final Content _____
A = Very Positive	_____
B = Positive	_____
C = Both Positive and Negative	_____
D = Negative	_____
E = Very Negative	_____
F = Neither Positive nor Negative	_____
 2. <u>Characterization of Congress:</u>	Initial Content _____
Mentions	Final Content _____
A = Very Positive	_____
B = Positive	_____
C = Both Positive and Negative	_____
D = Negative	_____
E = Very Negative	_____
F = Neither Positive nor Negative	_____
 3. <u>President's Position in Relation to Congress</u>	Initial Content _____
Mentions	Final Content _____
A = President Predominant	_____
B = President Subordinate	_____
C = President Coequal	_____

		Initial Content _____	Final Content _____	64
4. <u>President's Relationship with Congress</u>	Mentions			
_____	A = Accountable to Congress			
_____	B = Autonomous			
_____	C = Not Mentioned			
Decision Setting				
5. <u>Necessity of Military Action</u>	Mentions			
_____	A = Military Action Avoidable			
_____	B = Military Action Imperative			
6. <u>Justification for Position</u>	Mentions			
_____	A = Constitutional Grounds Invoked			
_____	B = Moral Grounds Invoked			
_____	C = Other Justifications Offered – (specify) _____			
7. <u>Nature of Crisis</u>	Mentions			
_____	A = Situation Seen as Threatening to National Interests			
_____	B = Situation Seen as an Opportunity for U.S. Interests (Inviting)			
8. <u>Urgency of Action</u>	Mentions			
_____	A = Immediate or Prompt Action Required			
_____	B = Action Should be Delayed or Postponed			
U.S. Interests and Objectives				
9. <u>Assessment of President's Policy</u>	Mentions			
_____	A = Very Positive			
_____	B = Positive			
_____	C = Both Positive and Negative			
_____	D = Negative			
_____	E = Very Negative			
_____	F = Neither Positive nor Negative			

10. Reflection upon Past Military Experiences: Initial Content _____ Initial Content _____ 65
Mentions

____ A = Appeal to Emulate Past
____ B = Appeal to Repudiate Past
____ C = Other – (specify) _____

11. Proper U.S. Policy Goals: Initial Content _____ Final Content _____
Mentions

____ A = Should Expand Current Initiatives
____ B = Should Retract (or Withdraw) from Current Initiatives
____ C = Should Not Change Goals

12. Means Appropriate to Achieve Goals: Initial Content _____ Final Content _____
Mentions

____ A = Combative
____ B = Pacific
____ C = Undecided

13. War Powers Act: Initial Content _____ Final Content _____
Mentions

____ A = Favorable Reference
____ B = Unfavorable Reference
____ C = Not Mentioned

External Circumstances

14. Condition of International Environment: Initial Content _____ Final Content _____
Mentions

____ A = Changing
____ B = Stable

15. Prospect: Initial Content _____ Final Content _____
Mentions

____ A = Favorable or Supportive of Military Action
____ B = Adverse or Resistive to Military Action

Internal Circumstances

16. Public Opinion: Initial Content _____ Final Content _____
Mentions

____ A = Supportive of Military Action
____ B = Opposed to Military Action
____ C = No Reference

17. Public Interest:

Mentions

A = Belief that Public is Apathetic

B = Belief that Public is Aroused

C = No Reference

Initial
Content_____

Final
Content_____

66

APPENDIX C
SECONDARY CODESHEET

Secondary Codesheet Item Number and Name (Record Number of Paragraphs With Mentions)

Text Number: _____

Name of Speaker: _____

Page _____ of _____

APPENDIX D

SAMPLE EXCERPT AND CODED TEXT: REPRESENTATIVE JOHN McCAIN

26118

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD—HOUSE

that U.S. forces were in hostilities or in situations where imminent involvement in hostilities was clearly indicated by the circumstances.

That is what the existing law in the War Powers Act says. The House is now faced with two problems. No. 1, how to protect the integrity of the existing law, the War Powers Act; No. 2, even more importantly than protecting the constitutional prerogative, the question of what U.S. policy in Lebanon ought to be.

Whatever our response is today it ought to take into account both necessities.

The answer of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in the resolution now before us is that Congress should authorize the continued presence of armed forces in Lebanon for up to 18 months. We believe that would be a profound mistake.

We want Congress to withhold that kind of a commitment for the time being and our substitute would do simply this: It would do two things: It would say that the President is given until the end of November, 90 days from the first American casualty, to either report under the War Powers Act the obvious, that our troops have been in a combat situation, or else to certify that the existing cease fire is holding and that real progress is being made on the political front in Lebanon to try to broaden the base of the Gemayel government and to resolve the political difference between presently divided parties.

If the President refused to do either, either to certify that the cease-fire was holding or to report under the War Powers Act, then we would exercise our constitutional prerogative, of which there can be no doubt, namely to cut off funds for the support of the operation in Lebanon.

If the President did certify under the War Powers Act, then the war powers clock would tick and Congress would have the 60 days listed in the law to decide what our appropriate response would be. And if the President exercised the other option to certify that a cease-fire was in existence, then he would have to report to this Congress every 30 days as to whether or not the cease-fire existed or he would have to report under the War Powers Act that it was not in existence any longer and our troops were in a confrontation situation.

That amendment does not cut and run; that amendment does not withdraw troops; it does not set short deadlines which the Syrians can outwait us on, but it does create equal pressure on the Syrians to negotiate and on the Gemayel government to broaden its base.

It is a reasonable compromise between those who want to commit the Congress to an 18 months presence in Lebanon and those who feel that we

ought to withdraw immediately. We try to cut a middle ground, and we defend the prerogatives of the Congress under the War Powers Act by buttressing that prerogative with another constitutional prerogative; namely, the right to cut off funds.

In doing that, we do not force withdrawal, we do give the President more time, but we do enforce the law and I think that is a decent compromise between the two extremes which have been suggested.

Mr. PEPPER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. OBEY. I yield to the chairman of the Committee on Rules.

Mr. PEPPER. Is the gentleman's amendment predicated upon the assumption of the validity of the War Powers Act?

Mr. OBEY. Yes; it is.

Mr. PEPPER. I am glad to hear that.

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman from Wisconsin (Mr. OBEY) has expired.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I yield 4 minutes to the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. McCAIN).

Mr. McCAIN. Mr. Chairman, it is with great reluctance that I rise in opposition to this resolution. I am well known for my respect for the President of the United States and for supporting his policies. I do not believe the President should be restricted in fulfilling his constitutionally mandated responsibility of conducting our Nation's foreign policy. However, when called on to make a judgment, as I am by this legislation, I have a responsibility to my constituents to carefully evaluate the alternatives, using whatever resources are at my command.

I have agonized over this issue, not only because of my personal experiences, but, more importantly, because of my training in military doctrine, strategy, and tactics. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, in an interview given shortly after the Indochina conflict, stated the conditions under which he thought it appropriate to introduce American combat troops overseas. First, the objectives of the involvement must be explainable to the man in the street in one or two sentences. Second, there must be clear support of the President by the Congress for the involvement. Third, there must be a reasonable expectation of success. Fourth, we must have the support of our allies for our objectives. And finally, there must be a clear U.S. national interest at stake. I do not view the U.S. involvement in Lebanon as meeting General Taylor's criteria.

I have listened carefully to the explanations offered for our involvement in Lebanon. I do not find them convincing.

The fundamental question is "What is the United States interest in Lebanon?" It is said we are there to keep

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the peace. I ask, what peace? It is said we are there to aid the government. I ask, what government? It is said we are there to stabilize the region. I ask, how can the U.S. presence stabilize the region?

Since 1975-76, we have seen a de facto partition of Lebanon. I see little possibility of this changing any time soon. I ask you, will the Lebanese Army ever be strong enough to drive out the Syrians, let alone the PLO? If the answer to this question is no, as I believe it is, then we had better be prepared to accept a lengthy and deeper involvement in the area.

I ask my colleagues, what incentive is there for the Syrians to engage in constructive peace talks? What do they gain from a peaceful Lebanon? Do you really think naval forces off the Lebanese coast is going to intimidate the Syrians so much so that they engage in meaningful negotiations? For this to occur, the Syrians must believe we will use the full military power at our disposal. Are we prepared to use this power? I do not think so nor do I believe the Syrians think so.

The longer we stay in Lebanon, the harder it will be for us to leave. We will be trapped by the case we make for having our troops there in the first place.

What can we expect if we withdraw from Lebanon? The same as will happen if we stay. I acknowledge that the level of fighting will increase if we leave. I regretfully acknowledge that many innocent civilians will be hurt. But I firmly believe this will happen in any event.

What about our allies and our worldwide prestige? We should consult with our allies and withdraw with them in concert, if possible, unilaterally if necessary. I also recognize that our prestige may suffer in the short term but I am more concerned with our long-term national interests. I believe the circumstances of our original involvement have changed and I know of four American families who share this view.

I am not calling for an immediate withdrawal of our forces. What I desire is as rapid withdrawal as possible.

I do not foresee obtainable objectives in Lebanon, I believe the longer we stay, the more difficult it will be to leave, and I am prepared to accept the consequences of our withdrawal. I will vote in opposition to this resolution.

□ 1200

Mr. HAMILTON. Mr. Chairman, I yield 2 minutes to the gentleman from Louisiana (Mr. ROEMER).

Mr. ROEMER. Mr. Chairman, I would like to speak in opposition to the resolution as crafted by Members of this body. And I would also like to compliment my colleague from Arizona.

<u>VARIABLE DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>CODE</u>	
Document Code	<u>H</u> <u>8</u> <u>3</u> - <u>2</u> <u>8</u>	
Date of Record/Testimony/Publication	<u>0</u> <u>9</u> / <u>2</u> <u>8</u> / <u>8</u> <u>3</u>	
Page Numbers of Analyzed Text (Start-End)	<u>26118</u> - <u>-</u>	
Number of Paragraphs Coded	<u>11</u>	
Name of Member	<u>McCain</u>	
 <u>Party Identification of Member</u>		
1 = Democrat	<u>2</u>	
2 = Republican		
 <u>Role of Member</u>	<u>1</u>	
1 = General		
2 = Leader		
 Roles: President and Congress		
 1. <u>Characterization of President:</u>	Initial Content <u>A</u>	Final Content <u>A</u>
Mentions		
<u>1</u>	A = Very Positive	
<u>-</u>	B = Positive	
<u>-</u>	C = Both Positive and Negative	
<u>-</u>	D = Negative	
<u>-</u>	E = Very Negative	
<u>-</u>	F = Neither Positive nor Negative	
 2. <u>Characterization of Congress:</u>	Initial Content <u>B</u>	Final Content <u>B</u>
Mentions		
<u>1</u>	A = Very Positive	
<u>-</u>	B = Positive	
<u>-</u>	C = Both Positive and Negative	
<u>-</u>	D = Negative	
<u>-</u>	E = Very Negative	
<u>-</u>	F = Neither Positive nor Negative	
 3. <u>President's Position in Relation to Congress</u>	Initial Content <u>A</u>	Final Content <u>A</u>
Mentions		
<u>1</u>	A = President Predominant	
<u>-</u>	B = President Subordinate	
<u>1</u>	C = President Coequal	

		Initial Content	Final Content	72
4. <u>President's Relationship with Congress</u>	Mentions			
<u>2</u>	A = Accountable to Congress			
<u>-</u>	B = Autonomous			
	C = Not Mentioned			
Decision Setting				
5. <u>Necessity of Military Action:</u>	Mentions			
<u>7</u>	A = Military Action Avoidable			
<u>-</u>	B = Military Action Imperative			
6. <u>Justification for Position:</u>	Mentions			
<u>1</u>	A = Constitutional Grounds Invoked			
<u>1</u>	B = Moral Grounds Invoked			
<u>3</u>	C = Other Justifications Offered – (specify) <u>Unattainable Objectives</u>			
7. <u>Nature of Crisis:</u>	Mentions			
<u>-</u>	A = Situation Seen as Threatening to National Interests			
<u>3</u>	B = Situation Seen as an Opportunity for U.S. Interests (Inviting)			
8. <u>Urgency of Action:</u>	Mentions			
<u>3</u>	A = Immediate or Prompt Action Required			
<u>-</u>	B = Action Should be Delayed or Postponed			
U.S. Interests and Objectives				
9. <u>Assessment of President's Policy:</u>	Mentions			
<u>1</u>	A = Very Positive			
<u>-</u>	B = Positive			
<u>4</u>	C = Both Positive and Negative			
	D = Negative			
	E = Very Negative			
	F = Neither Positive nor Negative			

		Initial Content <u>B</u>	Initial Content <u>B</u>	73
10. <u>Reflection upon Past Military Experiences:</u>	Mentions			
	<u>-</u>	A = Appeal to Emulate Past		
	<u>2</u>	B = Appeal to Repudiate Past		
	<u> </u>	C = Other – (specify) _____		
11. <u>Proper U.S. Policy Goals:</u>		Initial Content <u>B</u>	Final Content <u>B</u>	
	Mentions			
	<u>-</u>	A = Should Expand Current Initiatives		
	<u>8</u>	B = Should Retract (or Withdraw) from Current Initiatives		
12. <u>Means Appropriate to Achieve Goals:</u>		Initial Content <u>B</u>	Final Content <u>B</u>	
	Mentions			
	<u>-</u>	A = Combative		
	<u>6</u>	B = Pacific		
13. <u>War Powers Act:</u>		Initial Content <u>N/M</u>	Final Content <u>N/M</u>	
	<u>-</u>	A = Favorable Reference		
	<u>-</u>	B = Unfavorable Reference		
External Circumstances				
14. <u>Condition of International Environment:</u>		Initial Content <u>N/M</u>	Final Content <u>N/M</u>	
	Mentions			
	<u>-</u>	A = Changing		
	<u>-</u>	B = Stable		
15. <u>Prospect:</u>		Initial Content <u>B</u>	Final Content <u>B</u>	
	Mentions			
	<u>-</u>	A = Favorable or Supportive of Military Action		
	<u>7</u>	B = Adverse or Resistive to Military Action		
Internal Circumstances				
16. <u>Public Opinion:</u>		Initial Content <u>B</u>	Final Content <u>B</u>	
	Mentions			
	<u>-</u>	A = Supportive of Military Action		
	<u>1</u>	B = Opposed to Military Action		

17. Public Interest:

Mentions

A = Belief that Public is Apathetic
B = Belief that Public is Aroused

Initial
Content N/M

Final 74
Content N/M

Secondary Codesheet
Item Number and Name (Record Number of Paragraphs With Mentions)

75

Paragraph Num	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.
1. President	X																
2. Congress	X																
3. Position	X																
4. Relationship	X																
5. Necessity	X																
6. Justification	X																
7. Nature	X																
8. Urgency	X																
9. Policy	X																
10. Past	X																
11. Goals	X																
12. Means	X																
13. War Powers	X																
14. Condition	X																
15. Prospect	X																
16. Opinion	X																
17. Interest	X																
Total	1	1	1	2	7	1	3	3	1	4	2	8	6	7	1	6	1

Text Number: H-5

Name of Speaker: McCain

Page 1 of 1

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Matthew Mark Simmons was born to Raymond Henry and Jean Evelyn Simmons in Livingston, New Jersey, on April 2, 1975. He received his primary education at Howard C. Johnson Elementary School, and his intermediate education at Carl W. Goetz Middle School in Jackson, New Jersey. His secondary education was completed at Jackson Memorial High School in June, 1993. Matthew was appointed to the United States Air Force Academy in July, 1993, majoring in Political Science. He was assigned to temporary duties with the 52nd Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany in 1995, and with the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, D.C. in 1996. In 1997, he was inducted into Pi Sigma Alpha, the National Political Science Honor Society. In May, 1997, Matthew was commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the United States Air Force and received a Bachelor of Science as a Distinguished Graduate from the Air Force Academy. He was recognized as the top graduate in Political Science and was selected for the Graduate Scholarship Program, sponsored by the Air Force Institute of Technology. In August, 1997, Matthew entered the Graduate College at Arizona State University to pursue a master's degree in Political Science. In November, 1998, he entered Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training at Laughlin Air Force Base, Del Rio, Texas.